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SPRING 1966]
ADVISORY OPINIONS AS A PROBLEM
SOLVING PROCESS*
By DAVID LENEFSKY-
I.
INTRODUCTION
A RTICLE sixty-five of the Statute of the international Court of
Justice provides: "The Court may give an advisory opinion on
any legal question at the request of whatever body may be authorized
by or in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations to make
such a request."1 The jurisprudence of both the Permanent Court of
International Justice and the International Court of Justice demon-
strates the importance of advisory opinions. The Permanent Court
rendered thirty-one judgments in litigious cases and gave twenty-
seven advisory opinions. Thus far the International Court has ren-
dered seventeen judgments and has given advisory opinions on thirteen
requests. The advisory jurisdiction of the International Court has been
invoked for some of the most serious and difficult international prob-
lems, such as admission to membership in the United Nations, South-
West Africa and the expenditures of the United Nations operations in
the Middle East and Congo.
Plaudits have been heaped upon the International Court's judicial
authority to render advisory opinions; and States have been criticized
for not taking advantage of the advisory process "where a legal issue
may be resolved free of political interests or dialectics. '
It has been said that advisory proceedings provide "a means for
peacefully deciding questions of fact and law. . . . (E)ven disputes
of a political character may include an underlying or pertinent legal
issue, such as the interpretation of a treaty, which, if impartially and
authoritatively resolved, may contribute to the settlement of the larger
problems." (Emphasis added.)' It is this allegation, but only with
advisory opinions rendered by the International Court of Justice,
which is the primary concern of this article.
* The author records his debt to Professor Thomas M. Franck of New York
University School of Law for his many stimulating thoughts on International Law.
t B.A., 1959, University of Connecticut; LL.B., 1963, LL.M., 1964, New York
University; member, New York Bar.
1. STAT. INT'L CT. JUST. art. 65, para. 1.
2. 40 FOREiG- AFFAIRS 465 (1962).
3. Id. at 467, 470.
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The International Court of Justice, when deciding whether or not
to assume jurisdiction in an advisory proceeding, has often had to
refute some combination of the following jurisdictional objections:
1) that the question put to the court is intertwined with political
questions; 2) that the court is not competent to interpret the Charter
of the United Nations; 3) that the question interferes or intervenes
in the domestic jurisdiction of States according to Article 2, paragraph
7, of the Charter; and, 4) that an advisory opinion cannot be rendered
without the consent of all interested States.4
It is the major thesis of this paper that the International Court
of Justice, when deciding whether or not to assume jurisdiction in
advisory proceedings, should consider - in addition to refuting juris-
dictional objections contemplated by Articles 65 and 68 of the Statute
of the International Court of Justice - whether or not rendering an
advisory opinion would help solve the problem which gave rise to the
request for the opinion.5
The two advisory opinions concerning the admission of a State
to membership in the United Nations, the two opinions concerning
the Peace Treaties with Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania, and the
three opinions concerning the Territory of South-West Africa will
first be considered. A cursory examination of the events which induced
the General Assembly to request an advisory opinion, an analysis of
the questions submitted to the court, and the answers given will
demonstrate that the General Assembly should not have requested the
court for some of these advisory opinions, and that the court, regard-
less of its judicial -ability to refute various jurisdictional objections,
should not have always assumed jurisdiction.
II.
THE Two ADMISSION OPINIONS6
Article 4 of the Charter of the United Nations states:
1. Membership in the United Nations is open to all other
peace-loving states which accept the obligations contained in the
present Charter and, in the judgment of the Organization, are
able and willing to carry out these obligations.
4. Conditions of Admission to a State to Membership in the United Nations,
[1948] I.C.J. Rep. 61; Interpretation of Peace Treaties with Bulgaria, Hungary and
Romania, First Phase [1950] I.C.J. Rep. 71; Certain Expenses of the United Nations,
[1962] I.C.J. Rep. 155.
5. STAT. INT'L CT. JUST. art. 68. "In the exercise of its advisory functions the
Court shall further be guided by the provisions of the present Statute which apply
in contentious cases to the extent to which it recognizes them to be applicable."
6. Conditions of Admission, supra note 4, at 57; Competence of the General
Assembly for the Admission of a State to the United Nations, [1950] I.C.J. Rep. 4.
[VOL. 11 : p. 525
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2. The admission of any such state to membership in the
United Nations will be effected by a decision of the General
Assembly upon the recommendation of the Security Council.7
At the 204th meeting of the Security Council, on September 25,
1947, the applications of Bulgaria, Finland, Hungary, Italy and Ro-
mania for admission to the United Nations were considered.' The
delegate from the United Kingdom expressed his opinion that Italy
fulfilled the conditions for admission required by Article 4, paragraph
1. Poland introduced a draft resolution proposing that the Security
Council vote on one resolution that would recommend the admission
of all five applicants.1 The delegate from the Soviet Union said:
"We are ready to agree to the admission of Italy to the United Nations,
but only on the condition that all other countries which are in the
same position - namely - Bulgaria, Romania, Hungary and Finland
are also admitted." (Emphasis added.) 1
Belgium was the first to introduce the thought that the Polish
draft resolution, requiring a "collective decision," would add to the
conditions of admission established by Article 4, paragraph 1, of the
Charter.12 A dispute then arose between the Western Powers and
the Soviet Union and its associates on the Council over the behavior
of the Governments of Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania. The United
States contended that Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania did not fulfill
the requirements for admission established by Article 4. It was alleged
that the three ex-enemy States were violating the Peace Treaties be-
cause the rights and liberties of their respective peoples were jeopar-
dized, and that the present governments, supported only by a minority,
replaced governments elected at the end of World War II that were
"responsive to the will of the people."'"
At the 206th meeting, a Belgian proposal requiring separate and
final votes was adopted over Soviet objection.' 4 The applications
7. U.N. CHARTER art. 4, paras. 1-2.
8. U.N. SEcuRITY COUNCIL Opp. REc. 2d year, 204th meeting 2408 (S/Agenda/-
204/Rev. 1) (1947).
9. Id. at 2409.
10. Id. at 2412.
In conclusion, I am submitting to the Security Council a draft resolution which
can settle the whole question. The text is as follows:
The Security Council,
Having received and examined the applications for membership in the United
Nations submitted by Hungary, Italy, Romania, Bulgaria and Finland,
Recommends to the General Assembly that these countries be admitted as
Members of the United Nations.
11. Id. at 2414.
12. Id. at 2421.
13. Id. at 2425, 2446, 2453.
14. U.N. SECURITY COUNCIL Ori. Rec. 2d year, 206th meeting 2475 (S/Agenda/-
206) (1947). Article 27, paragraph 2 states: "Decisions of the Security Council on pro-
cedural matters shall be made by an affirmative vote of seven members."
SPRING 1966]
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of Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania were then rejected because of
failure to obtain the affirmative votes of seven members. 5 The applica-
tions of Italy and Finland were rejected because one (USSR) of the
two (USSR and Poland) votes opposed was a permanent member. 6
On November 17, 1947, the General Assembly adopted a resolu-
tion requesting the court to give an advisory opinion to the following
questions:
Is a member of the United Nations which is called upon in virtue
of Article 4 of the Charter, to pronounce itself by its vote, either
in the Security Council or in the General Assembly, on the ad-
mission of a State to membership in the United Nations, jurid-
ically entitled to make its consent to the admission dependent on
conditions not expressly provided by paragraph 1 of the said
Article? In particular, can such a Member, while it recognizes
the conditions set forth in that provision to be fulfilled by the
State concerned, subject its affirmative vote to the additional condi-
tion that other States be admitted to membership in the United
Nations together with that State ?1 7
The court concluded that a member of the United Nations is not
juridically entitled to make its consent to the admission of a State
dependent on conditions not expressly provided by paragraph 1; and,
that a member cannot subject its affirmative vote to the additional
condition that other States be admitted to membership together with
that State.' 8
It is submitted that the General Assembly should not have pre-
sented these questions to the court for an advisory opinion and that
the court was in error in assuming jurisdiction. The questions pre-
sented to the court concerned the conduct of the Soviet delegate in
the Security Council. The important point is that the problem of
adherence to the opinion depended solely upon the behavior of one
State.
When the General Assembly adopted the resolution requesting
the court to render an advisory opinion, the majority of the General
Assembly placed themselves - figuratively, not legally - before
the court. The Assembly did not place the Soviet Union before the
court nor did the Soviet Union do so by submitting a written statement
15. Id. at 2475-76. Australia, Belgium, Brazil, China, the United Kingdom and
the United States abstained in the voting on Hungary. China, Columbia, France and
Syria voted in favour of Romania's application. Only Syria voted for Bulgaria's
application.
16. Id. at 2476.
17. U.N. GXN. Ass. Orn. Rsc. 2d Sess., Plenary 1078 (A/471) (1947).
18. Conditions of Admission, supra note 4, at 65.
[VOL. 11 : p. 525
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on the merits of the question submitted to the court. 9 The party
(Soviet Union) whose actions would determine whether or not the
advisory opinion would be implemented was not the party (Assembly)
which requested the opinion. The General Assembly could have stood
on its head and performed all sorts of mental gymnastics, but it could
not have implemented the opinion because the questions submitted to
the court by the Assembly were formulated in such a manner that
they would not allow the Assembly to implement the answers.
According to the Charter of the United Nations, "solving inter-
national problems" is a primary purpose of the Organization. 0 The
Statute of the International Court of Justice provides that the court
is "the principal judicial organ of the United Nations."'" It is sub-
mitted that after "the principal judicial organ of the United Nations"
rendered it first advisory opinion, the United Nations was no more
closer to solving the admissions problem than it was before the
Assembly requested the opinion.
It has been said: "While in a formal sense it may be true that
an opinion does not have the binding force of a judgment, practically
it does, as an authoritative statement of law, have almost the same
legal effect." 2 This is simply jurisprudential polemics.
The United Nations was, at this time, in the midst of a momentous
international problem. Applications for admission to membership were
being rejected because of a dispute between the Soviet Union and the
West. In fact, only five States achieved membership between September
25, 1947, the day of the 204th Security Council meeting, and December
14, 1955, when the dispute was finally settled 23 - at which time
sixteen States received recommendations from the Security Council. 24
Obviously, the crucial questions are: to whom are advisory opin-
ions "authoritative statements of law," and, to whom does an advisory
opinion "have almost the same legal effect" as a judgment. If advisory
opinions are "authoritative statements of law," and, if opinions "have
almost the same legal effect" as judgments, then this is true only to
law students and to the majority of the General Assembly who re-
19. Conditions of Admission of a State to Membership in the United Nations -
Pleadings, Oral Arguments, and Documents 29 (I.C.J. 1948).
20. U.N. CHARTER art. I, para. 3.
21. STAT. INT'L CT. JUST. art. I.
22. Sloan, Advisory Jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice, 38 CALIr.
L. Rpv. 830, at 855 (1950).
23. Pakistan and Yemen, September 30, 1947; Burma, April 19, 1948; Israel,
May 11, 1949; Indonesia, September 28, 1950.
24. Albania, Austria, Bulgaria, Cambodia, Ceylon, Finland, Hungary, Ireland,
Italy, Jordan, Laos, Libya, Nepal, Portugal, Romania, Spain. The fantastic political
compromise that ended this eight year deadlock consisted of individual voting on all
applicants "about which no problem of unification arises." U.N. GEN. Ass. OFF. REc.
10th Sess., Supp. No. 19, at 8 (918(X)) (1955).
SPRING 1966]
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quested the opinion. The first Admission advisory opinion was not an
"authoritative statement of law" and did not "have almost the same
legal effect" as a judgment to the only State that could have imple-
mented the opinion. It seems self-evident that the majority of the
Assembly cannot expect to aid the solution of problems by requesting
the court to render an opinion which the Assembly cannot effectively
utilize.
The General Assembly, at its 177th plenary meeting on December
8, 1948, adopted a resolution which "recommends that each member
of the Security Council and the General Assembly, in exercising its
vote on the admission of new Members, should act in accordance with
the foregoing opinion of the International Court of Justice."25 Cer-
tainly, no one could possibly contend that this resolution could aid the
solution to the admissions problem. If the majority of the Assembly
desires aid from the court in solving an international problem, then
the questions submitted for the court's advisory opinion must, in reality,
concern the conduct of the majority of the Assembly and the questions
must be formulated in such a manner that the majority of the Assembly
will determine whether or not the advisory opinion will be implemented.
At the 428th meeting of the Security Council, on June 21, 1949,
the Soviet delegate declared: "To facilitate the solution of this problem,
the Government of the Soviet Union is submitting a proposal for
the simultaneous admission to membership in the United Nations of
all twelve States.....26
On November 22, 1949, the General Assembly adopted a resolu-
tion requesting the court to render an advisory opinion on the following
question:
Can the admission of a State to membership in the United Nations,
pursuant to Article 4, paragraph 2, of the Charter, be effected
by a decision of the General Assembly when the Security Council
has made no recommendation for admission by reason of the
candidate failing to obtain the requisite majority or of the negative
vote of a permanent Member upon a resolution so to recommend ?27
By a vote of twelve to two the court declared that the admission
of a State to membership in the United Nations, pursuant to Article
4, paragraph 2, of the Charter, cannot be effected by a decision of the
General Assembly without a prior recommendation from the Security
Council.2 8
25. U.N. GEN. Ass. Op'. R~c. 3d Sess., Plenary 800 (A/761) (1948).
26. U.N. SECURITY COUNCIL Orv. REc. 4th year, 428th meeting 11-12 (S/Agenda
428) (1949).
27. U.N. GEN. Ass. On'. Rtc. 4th Sess., Plenary 329 (A/1066) (1949).
28. Competence of the General Assembly, supra note 6, at 10.
[VOL. 11 : p. 525
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Of course, the second Admission opinion did not solve the ad-
missions problem, that is, it did not provide a solution whereby the
membership of the United Nations could be increased pursuant to
Article 4 of the Charter. However, this was obviously not a defect in
the question submitted to the court. The question presented in the
second request was a proper subject for an advisory opinion and,
therefore, the court was correct in assuming jurisdiction. The party
requesting the opinion was the only one capable of implementing the
opinion. The utility of the opinion did not depend upon one State.
If the court had declared that the Assembly could admit a State to
membership without a prior recommendation from the Security Council,
then - contrary to the questions submitted in the first admission
request - the implementation of the second Admission opinion would
depend upon the will of the majority of the Assembly and one State
could not have prevented adherence to the opinion.
III.
THE Two PEACE TREATIES OPINIONS 9
The articles of the Peace Treaties concluded with Bulgaria,
Hungary and Romania in 1947, pertinent to the "dispute" herein
reported, and which the International Court of Justice had to consider
in its advisory opinions of March 30, and July 18, 1950, are as follows:
Except where another procedure is specifically provided under
any article of the present Treaty, any dispute concerning the
interpretation or execution of the Treaty, which is not settled by
direct diplomatic negotiations, shall be referred to the Three Heads
of Mission acting under Article 35, except that in this case the
Heads of Mission will not be restricted by the time-limit provided
in that Article. Any such dispute not resolved by them within
a period of two months shall, unless the parties to the dispute
mutually agree upon another means of settlement, be referred at
the request of either party to the dispute to a Commission com-
posed of one representative of each party and a third member
selected by mutual agreement of the two parties from nationals
of a third country. Should the two parties fail to agree within
a period of one month upon the appointment of the third member,
the Secretary-General of the United Nations may be requested
by either party to make the appointment.80
29. Interpretation of Peace Treaties with Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania,
First Phase [1950] I.C.J. Rep. 65; Second Phase [1950] I.C.J. Rep. 221.
30. Article 36 of the Treaty with Bulgaria, to which correspond Article 40 of
the Treaty with Hungary and Article 38 of the Treaty with Romania.
SPRING 1966]
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United States notes dated April 2, 1949 to Bulgaria, Hungary
and Romania alleged that these Governments breached an international
obligation created by Article 2 of the Treaty with Bulgaria, Article 2,
paragraph 1, of the Treaty with Hungary, and Article 3, paragraph 1,
of the Treaty with Romania."' The United States contended that these
three ex-enemy States regularly denied large numbers of their populace
basic human rights secured for them under these Treaties of Peace. 2
The note to Bulgaria mentioned the execution of Nikola Petkov,
National Agrarian Union Leader, "who dared to express democratic
opinions which did not correspond to those of the Bulgarian Govern-
ment.""3 The proceedings against Cardinal Mindszenty and Lutheran
Bishop Ordass were noted to the Hungarian Government as an attempt
to substitute members of the Communist Party for "independent"
clergymen, thereby constituting a violation of religious freedom pro-
vided by the Treaty of Peace.84 The trial and sentence to life imprison-
ment of Iuliu Maniu, President of the National Peasant Party, and
other leaders were cited to the Romanian Government as violations
of political freedom and perversion of judicial process. 5
The United States was informed by a Hungarian note of April 8,
1949, a Bulgarian note of April 21, 1949, and a Romanian note of
April 18, 1949, that compliance with the provisions of the Peace
Treaties were insured because "all discrimination as to race, sex,
language and religion" which existed under previous regimes, were
abolished.
86
Following this, United States notes of May 31, 1949, to Bulgaria,
Hungary and Romania stated that the notes received from these
Governments did not provide "a satisfactory reply to the specific
charges set forth" by the United States notes of April 2, 1949."7 The
Governments of Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania were told that as
a consequence of such deficiency, a dispute had arisen concerning the
interpretation and execution of the Peace Treaties which these Govern-
ments had not attempted to settle by direct diplomatic negotiations.
As a result, the United States was forced to refer the dispute to the
Governments of the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union for joint
consideration under the provisions of Article 36 of the Treaty with
31. Interpretation of Peace Treaties with Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania -
Pleadings, Oral Arguments, and Documents, 23-30 (I.C.J. 1950).
32. Id. at 24, 26, 27.
33. Id. at 24.
34. Id. at 27.
35. Id. at 29.
36. Id. at 30, 32, 34.
37. Id. at 36, 37, 38.
[VOL. 11 : p. 525
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Bulgaria, Article 40 of the Treaty with Hungary, and Article 38 of
the Treaty with Romania.8
On the same day, the United States Minister in Sofia, the Charge
D'Affaires in Budapest and the Minister in Bucharest dispatched letters
to the Soviet Ambassadors in these countries. Allegations, similar to
those in the notes to Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania, were repeated.
The Soviet Ambassadors were requested to communicate to the United
States Legations the earliest date available for a Heads of Mission
meeting.39
The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics note of June 11, 1949
to the United States stated that the behavior of the Governments of
Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania was within the domestic jurisdiction
of sovereign States because the behavior was "directed toward the
fulfillment of the Peace Treaties which obligates the said countries to
combat organizations of the fascist type and other organizations which
have as their aim denial to the people of their democratic rights."4"
As a result, the Soviet Government had no reason for participating in
a Heads of Mission meeting.
A United States note of August 1, 1949 to Bulgaria, Hungary
and Romania stated that since the dispute had neither been settled
by direct negotiation between the United States and the three countries,
nor by the Three Heads of Mission, the United States Government
was requesting that the dispute be referred to a Commission in accord-
ance with the previously mentioned provisions of the respective Peace
Treaties.41
A Hungarian note of August 26, 1949, a Bulgarian note of
September 1, 1949 and a Romanian note of September 2, 1949 informed
the United States Government that since their Governments had con-
tinuously satisfied the Peace Treaties, no dispute existed concerning
the interpretation or execution of the Peace Treaties. As a result, the
United States Government did not establish any need for the creation
of a Treaty Commission. 2
Joinder of issue was raised by the United States notes of Sep-
tember 19, 1949. The Governments of Bulgaria, Hungary and Ro-
mania were informed that they had no right to declare unilaterally
that a dispute over the interpretation of the Peace Treaties did not
exist. Since the interpretations placed upon the behavior of the Bul-
garian, Hungarian and Romanian Governments by the interested parties
38. Ibid.
39. Id. at 38-44.
40. Id. at 52.
41. Id. at 58-61.
42. Id. at 61-64.
SPRING 1966]
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did not correspond with each other, it was charged that the existence
of a dispute was obvious. The Governments of Bulgaria, Hungary
and Romania were accused of breaching a second international obliga-
tion by their refusal to join with the United States in forming a
Commission. United States interference in the sovereignty of Bulgaria,
Hungary and Romania was justified on the grounds that international
obligations, arising from the Peace Treaties, limit the sovereignty
of all signatories, including the United States.48
Similar exchanges occurred between the United Kingdom and
Bulgaria, Hungary, Romania and the Soviet Union."'
While these diplomatic notes and letters were being exchanged,
the Charter provision declaring that the United Nations shall promote
"universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental
freedom for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or re-
ligion," '45 was used as justification by the Assembly for considering
the question of the "observance of human rights and fundamental
freedoms" in Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania."'
On October 22, 1949, the General Assembly adopted a resolution
requesting the court to render an advisory opinion to the following
questions :
1. Do the diplomatic exchanges between Bulgaria, Hungary
and Romania, on the one hand, and certain Allied and Associated
Powers signatories to the Treaties of Peace, on the other, concern-
ing the implementation of Article 2 of the Treaties with Bulgaria
and Hungary and Article 3 of the Treaty with Romania, disclose
disputes subject to the provisions for the settlement of disputes
contained in Article 36 of the Treaty of Peace with Bulgaria.
Article 40 of the Treaty of Peace with Hungary, and Article 38
of the Treaty of Peace with Romania?
In the event of an affirmative reply to question 1:
2. Are the Governments of Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania
obligated to carry out the provisions of the articles referred to in
question 1, including the provisions for the appointment of their
representatives to the Treaty Commissions ?
7
By eleven votes to three, the court declared that the diplomatic
exchanges disclosed disputes contained in the Peace Treaties, and that
the Governments of Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania were under an
43. Id. at 65-69.
44. Id. at 72-85, 88-104, 108.
45. U.N. CHARTER art. 55 (c).
46. U.N. GIgN. Ass. OrI. Rtc. 3d Sess., Plenary 5 (A/829) (1949); U.N. GitN.
Ass. Ovr. REc. 4th Sess., Ad Hoc Pol. Comm. 25 (A/985, A/985/Corr.1, A/990)
(1949).
47. U.N. GsN. Ass. Ori. Ric. 4th Sess., Plenary 329 (A/1066) (1949).
[VOL. 11 : p. 525
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international obligation to appoint representatives to the Treaty Com-
missions. 8
Although the subject matter of the questions submitted to the
court in the first Interpretation opinion had nothing in common with
the questions submitted in the first Admission opinion, both requests
submitted questions of the same kind. The questions submitted in the
first Interpretation opinion were formulated in such a manner that
only Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania could have implemented the
advisory opinion.
Before answering the questions submitted, the court refuted many
jurisdictional objections, one of which was that without the consent
of all interested States (Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania), the court
could not render an advisory opinion. 4 ' The court distinguished
contentious cases, where the consent of all States party to a dispute
is the basis of the court's jurisdiction, from advisory proceedings, where
the court's reply is only of an advisory character, and, as such, the
opinion has "no binding force."5 ° The court stated: "It follows that
no State, whether a Member of the United Nations or not, can prevent
the giving of an advisory opinion which the United Nations considers to
be desirable in order to obtain enlightenment as to the course of action
it should take." (Emphasis added.) 5
What action could the General Assembly take in order to imple-
ment this advisory opinion? The passage of a resolution noting that
the Governments of Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania have refused
to appoint their representatives to the Treaty Commissions could neither
implement the opinion nor aid the solution to the problem.52
On July 18, 1950, the court rendered the second phase of the
Interpretation opinion. By a vote of eleven to two the court answered
in the negative, the following question:
If one party fails to appoint a representative to a Treaty Com-
mission under the Treaties of Peace with Bulgaria, Hungary and
Romania where that party is obligated to appoint a representative
to the Treaty Commission, is the Secretary General of the United
Nations authorized to appoint the third member of the Com-
mission upon the request of the other party to a dispute according
to the provisions of the respective Treaties ?
48. Interpretation of Peace Treaties, First Phase, supra note 29, at 77.
49. Id. at 71.
50. Ibid.
51. Ibid.
52. Resolution 385(V) states that the General Assembly "takes note of the
advisory opinion." U.N. GZN. Ass. Or1. Ric. 5th Sess., Plenary 368 (A/1437)
(1950). U.N. Doc. No. A/1437, p. 4 (1950).
53. Interpretation of Peace Treaties, Second Phase, supra note 29.
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The similarities between the two Admission opinions and the two
Interpretation opinions are too striking to pass without comment.
In both initial requests, the General Assembly requested judicial guid-
ance concerning specific international problems; nevertheless, in order
for the advisory opinions to be an effective aid in solving those
problems, the positive responses of one member of the United Nations
and three nonmembers were required. Nothing that the General
Assembly could have done in response to the advisory opinions could
have aided the solution of the problems.
The questions submitted in both of the second requests were proper
for an advisory opinion in the sense that they permitted the General
Assembly to implement, and thereby utilize, the opinions. In the second
phase of the Interpretation opinion, if the court had declared that the
Secretary-General could appoint a Treaty Commissioner, then nothing
that the Governments of Bulgaria, Hungary or Romania could have
done, would have prevented the advisory opinion from being imple-
mented.
IV.
THE SOUTH-WEST AFRICA OPINIONS"4
The similarities between the two Admission opinions and the two
Interpretation opinions must be extended to include some aspects of
the South-West Africa opinions.
On February 9, 1946, the General Assembly, at its 27th plenary
meeting, adopted a resolution requesting States administering territories
held under mandates received from the League of Nations, to negotiate
trusteeship agreements for submission to the United Nations.5 There-
after, the Union of South Africa requested the General Assembly to
54. International Status of South-West Africa, [1950] I.C.J. Rep. 128; Voting
Procedure on Questions Relating to Reports and Petitions Concerning the Territory
of South-West Africa, [1955] I.C.J. Rep. 67; Admissibility of Hearings of Petitions
by the Committee on South-West Africa, [1956] I.C.J. Rep. 23. The Voting Pro-
cedure opinion is not discussed in the body of this article. The General Assembly
requested the court to render an advisory opinion on the following questions:
Is the following rule on the voting procedure to be followed by the General
Assembly a correct interpretation of the advisory opinion of the International
Court of Justice of 11 July 1950:
Decisions of the General Assembly on questions relating to reports and
petitions concerning the Territory of South-West Africa shall be regarded
as important questions within the meaning of Article 18, paragraph 2, of the
Charter of the United Nations?
If this interpretation of the advisory opinion of the Court is not correct, what
voting procedure should be followed by the General Assembly in taking decisions
on questions relating to reports and petitions concerning the Territory of South-
West Africa?
Obviously, the questions submitted were proper for an advisory opinion.
55. U.N. GIN. Ass. Ovv. Rnc. 1st Sess., Annex 13 Plenary 588 (A/341) (1946).
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approve the annexation of the Territory of South-West Africa. 6
On December 14, 1946, the request was denied by an Assembly resolu-
tion which also repeated the invitation to the Union to place the Terri-
tory under the Trusteeship System. 7 At the 33d meeting of the Fourth
Committee, on September 27th, 1947, the Union declared that it was not
under an international obligation to place the Territory under the
Trusteeship System, and that "the right to petition (from the inhabi-
tants of the Territory) had ceased to exist with the disappearance of
the League of Nations, the authority to which petitions could be ad-
dressed. In the absence of a trusteeship agreement, the United Nations
had no jurisdiction over South-West Africa and therefore no right
to receive petitions." s
On December 6, 1949, the General Assembly adopted a resolution
requesting the court to render an advisory opinion on, inter alia, the
following question: "Does the Union of South Africa continue to have
international obligations under the Mandate for South-West Africa
and, if so, what are these obligations ?""9
By twelve votes to two, the court declared that the Union had
an international obligation to transmit petitions from the inhabitants
of the Territory to the United Nations.6"
After six years of refusing to transmit petitions to the United
Nations, the General Assembly, on December 3, 1955, requested the
court to render an advisory opinion on whether it was consistent with
the advisory opinion of July 11, 1950 for the Committee on South-
West Africa to grant oral hearings to petitioners on matters relating
to the Territory of South-West Africa.6 The majority of the court
declared that although oral hearings were not granted to petitioners by
the Permanent Mandates Commission of the League of Nations,6"
the grant of oral hearings by the Committee on South-West Africa
would be consistent with the advisory opinion of 1950.3
Do judicial declarations - that a State cannot condition its vote,
that a State has an international obligation to appoint a Treaty Com-
missioner and that a State has an international obligation to transmit
petitions - help the United Nations solve international problems?
56. U.N. G-N. Ass. Ovr. Rnc. 1st Sess., 4th Comm. Annex 13a (A/C.4/42)
(1946).
57. U.N. GEN. Ass. OFP. Rc. 1st Sess., 2d Part Plenary 1327 (A/250/Add.1/-
Rev. 1) (1946).
58. U.N. G8N. Ass. OFr. Rxc. 2d Sess., 4th Comm. 16 (A/334, A/334/Add.1,
A/C.4/94, A/C.4/95, A/C.4/96 and A/C.4/97) (1947).
59. U.N. GN. Ass. Ovv. Rc. 4th Sess., Plenary 537 (A/1180) (1949).
60. International Status, supra note 54, at 143.
61. U.N. G8N. Ass. On?. R~c. 10th Sess., Plenary 399 (A/3043) (1955).
62. Admissibility of Hearings, supra note 54, at 28.
63. Id. at 32.
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After the first Admission opinion, the Assembly had to return to the
court and ask whether or not it could by-pass the Security Council
in order to admit States to membership in the United Nations. After
the first Interpretation advisory opinion, the Assembly had to return
to the court and ask whether or not the United Nations could by-pass
the Peace Treaties by establishing a Treaty Commission which would
not consist of a Commissioner from Bulgaria, Hungary or Romania.
After the first South-West Africa advisory opinion, the Assembly
again found it necessary to return to the court and inquire whether
or not the United Nations could by-pass the procedure of the League
of Nations by granting oral hearings to petitioners.
Let us backtrack for a moment and take a slightly different view
of the Assembly's conduct in order to determine what possible value,
if any, these requests for advisory opinions might have in solving
these three international problems.
On November 17th, 1947, the day that the Assembly adopted the
resolution requesting the court to render the first Admission opinion,
the Assembly (before the request resolution was adopted) had adopted
resolutions requesting the Security Council to reconsider the applica-
tions of, inter alia, Italy and Finland.6 4 Both resolutions stated "that
the opposition to the above mentioned application (Italy and Finland)
was based on grounds not included in Article 4 of the Charter."' 5
Obviously, the majority of the General Assembly was of the opinion
that a State was not juridically entitled to subject its affirmative vote
to the condition that other States be simultaneously admitted to mem-
bership in the United Nations. What practical effect could an advisory
opinion have under these circumstances?
If the court had said that a State could subject its affirmative vote
to the condition that other States be simultaneously admitted to mem-
bership, then the majority of the Assembly would have had the choice
between disregarding the advisory opinion or adhering to an advisory
opinion which juridically rejected their previously stated position. This
is indeed an impossible and humiliating choice. The Western Powers
opposed the applications of Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania on the
grounds that the applicants did not satisfy Article 4 of the Charter,"6
and not because the Soviet Union was conditioning its vote. If Western
opposition continued (as it did), then the Soviet Union (as it did)
would have continued to oppose the applications of, inter alia, Italy and
Finland. In short, no matter how the court answered the questions in
1
64. See note 17 supra.
65. Ibid.
66. See note 13 supra.
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the first admission request, the General Assembly could not have effec-
tively used that advisory opinion in solving the admissions problem.
The very same resolution requesting the court for the first Interpre-
tation advisory opinion states:
Whereas the General Assembly, on 30 April, 1949, adopted Res-
olution 272(111) concerning this question in which it expressed
its deep concern at the grave accusations made against the Go-
vernments of Bulgaria and Hungary regarding the suppression
of human rights and fundamental freedoms in those countries
* . . and most urgently drew the attention of the Governments of
Bulgaria and Hungary to their obligations under the Peace
Treaties, including the obligation to cooperate in the settlement
of the question ... "
Obviously, the majority of the General Assembly was of the
opinion that disputes existed which were subject to the provisions of
the Peace Treaties, and that an international obligation existed to
appoint Treaty Commissioners.
The same fact pattern with identical consequences existed with
the South-West Africa problem. The resolution requesting the court
for the first South-West Africa opinion included references to three
Assembly resolutions which recommended that the Territory be placed
under the Trusteeship System.6" Once again, it is obvious that the
majority of the Assembly was of the opinion that the Union was
obligated to transmit petitions to the United Nations. If the court
had said that the Union was not under an international obligation
to transmit petitions, then the majority of the Assembly would have
had the same choice that it would have had if the court said "yes" in
the first Admission opinion, and "no" in the first phase of the Interpre-
tation opinion. In fact, such a choice was imposed upon the majority
of the Assembly as a result of the first South-West Africa opinion.
The Assembly, in the first South-West Africa request, asked the court
whether Chapter XII of the Charter was applicable to the Territory.
6 9
The court interpreted this question to mean whether the Charter im-
posed an international obligation upon the Union to place the Terri-
tory under the Trusteeship System. 70 The court declared that the
Union was not under an international obligation to do so.71 As a
result, the majority of the Assembly had the choice between disregard-
67. See note 47 supra. Consideration of the Peace Treaty with Romania began
on September 22, 1949. U.N. GiN. Ass. Orr. Rtc. 4th Sess., Gen. Comm. 3-4
(A/989) (1949).
68. See note 59 supra.
69. Ibid.
70. International Status, supra note 54, at 139.
71. Id. at 144.
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ing the opinion or adhering to an opinion which juridically did not
help the majority, which, at the very least, believed that a moral obli-
gation was imposed upon the Union to place the Territory under the
Trusteeship System. 2 Recall that the Assembly's resolution of Decem-
ber 14, 1946, which denied the Union's request to annex the Territory,
was adopted by a vote of thirty-seven in favor and nine abstentions.73
On the other hand, if the court said that an international obligation
did exist to place the Territory under the Trusteeship System, then
the majority of the Assembly would not have been capable of imple-
menting the opinion.
The Assembly, in the first South-West Africa request, also asked
the court whether the Union had "the competence to modify the inter-
national status of the Territory of South-West Africa. . .. "" The
negative reply by the court75 did not undo what was already partially
accomplished. When the Assembly rejected the Union's request to
annex the Territory, the Secretary-General received a letter from the
Union stating: "The Union Government have therefore decided not
to proceed with the incorporation of the Territory desired by its inhabi-
tants (however, the Union Parliament did decide that the) Territory
should be represented in the Parliament of the Union as an integral
portion thereof ....
V.
THE EXPENSES ADVISORY OPINION
7 1
The Charter of the United Nations provides:
1. The General Assembly shall consider and approve the
budget of the Organization.
2. The expenses of the Organization shall be borne by the
Members as apportioned by the General Assembly.78
It has been the position of some States that the operations of
the United Nations, in the Middle East (hereinafter referred to as
UNEF) and in the Congo (hereinafter referred to as ONUC),
72. The French delegate thought that "the Mandatory Power had no legal
obligation under the Charter to submit a trusteeship agreement. . . . Passing to the
moral obligation of the Mandatory Power to submit a trusteeship agreement, he
considered that it was certainly a very strong one." U.N. GgN. Ass. Orp. Rtc. 2d
Sess., 4th Comm. 11-12 (A/334, A/334/Add.1 and A/C.4/94) (1947).
73. See note 57 supra.
74. See note 59 supra.
75. International Status, supra note 54, at 144.
76. U.N. Doc. No. A/334, p. 2.
77. Certain Expenses of the United Nations, [1962] I.C.J. Rep. 151.
78. U.N. CHARTER art. 17, paras. 1-2.
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were undertaken in violation of the Charter of the United Nations.
As a result, it has been contended that the expenditures for these
operations are not expenses of the United Nations and therefore, not
apportionable among the member States by the General Assembly
pursuant to Article 17, paragraph 2."
On December 20, 1961, the General Assembly adopted a resolu-
tion requesting the court to render an advisory opinion on whether
the expenses of UNEF and ONUC were "expenses of the Organiza-
tion" within the meaning of Article 17, paragraph 2, of the Charter."
Obviously, it was hoped that an affirmative answer would encourage
payment from those States in arrears.
It seems that the expenses question submitted to the court fits
somewhere in between those questions, the answers to which the
Assembly can implement, and those questions, the answers to which
the Assembly cannot implement. An affirmative answer does not pro-
vide the United Nations with money; nevertheless, an affirmative
answer does permit the majority of the Assembly to effectively utilize
the opinion. The majority of the Assembly would not be in the position
that it was after the court rendered the first Admission, Interpreta-
tion and South-West Africa advisory opinions. An affirmative answer
in the Expenses advisory opinion would not induce the majority of the
Assembly to return to the court to inquire whether the United Nations
could by-pass the Charter. With an affirmative answer, the majority of
the Assembly could include the costs of UNEF and ONUC in the
budget of the Organization, and could apportion those expenses among
the members of the Organization. Additional utilization of the ad-
visory opinion, by the Assembly, could be had with Article 19 which
provides that the Assembly has the power to suspend a member's
vote in the Assembly "if the amount of its arrears equals or exceeds
the amount of the contributions due from it for the preceding two
full years."'" Of course, the majority of the Assembly might desire
another advisory opinion from the court concerning some aspect of
Article 19; however, the point is that, contrary to the admissions, inter-
pretations and South-West Africa problems, Article 19 provides the
Assembly with power to effect a decision. The Charter provides no
explicit provision permitting the Assembly to vote on applications
to membership without a prior recommendation from the Security
79. Certain Expenses of the United Nations, - Pleadings, Oral Arguments, and
Documents 177, 270 (I.C.J. 1962).
80. U.N. GEN. Ass. OFF. REc. 16th Sess., Plenary 1162 (A/5062, A/5065, A/5066,
A/5075, A/5076) (1961).
81. U.N. CHART R art. 19.
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Council.82 The Peace Treaties did not explicitly provide for the Secre-
tary-General to appoint a third Treaty Commissioner in the absence
of Bulgaria's, Hungary's and Romania's appointment.8" The League
of Nations provided no precedent for granting oral hearings.8 4
VI.
THE REMAINING FIVE ADVISORY OPINIONS
In order to avoid confusion, it is necessary to report, in outline
form, the quintessence of the questions submitted to the court in the
remaining five advisory opinions.
1) Reparation for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United
Nations."' "Has the United Nations, as an Organization, the capacity
to bring an international claim against the responsible de jure or de facto
government with a view to obtaining the reparation due . . . ?1)86
2) Reservations to the Convention on the Prevention and Punish-
ment of the Crime of Genocide.8 7 "Can the reserving State be regarded
as being a party to the Convention while still maintaining its reserva-
tion if the reservation is objected to by one or more of the parties to
the Convention but not by others ?,,"8
3) Effects of Awards of Compensation Made by the United
Nations Administrative Tribunal."9 "Has the General Assembly the
right on any grounds to refuse to give effect to an award of compensa-
tion made by that Tribunal in favour of a staff member of the United
Nations whose contract of service has been terminated without his
assent ?""o
4) Judgments of the Administrative Tribunal of the International
Labour Organisation Upon Complaints Made Against the United
Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization."' "Was
82. See U.N. CHARTER art. 4.
83. See note 30 supra.
84. See note 62 supra.
85. Reparation for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations, [1949]
I.C.J. Rep. 174.
86. U.N. GEN. Ass. Opp. Ri c. 3d Sess., Annexes, Agenda Item No. 47, at 459
(A/748/Rev.1) (1948).
87. Reservation to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the
Crime of Genocide, [1951] I.C.J. Rep. 15. This paper is not concerned with whether
or not these questions were too broad in scope to permit a useful "yes" or "no" answer.
88. U.N. GIN. Ass. OFF. REc. 5th Sess., Annexes, Agenda Item No. 56, at 29
(A/1517) (1950).
89. Effect of Award of Compensation Made by the United Nations Administra-
tive Tribunal, [1954] I.C.J. Rep. 47.
90. U.N. GEN. Ass. Oir. Ric. 8th Sess., Annexes, Agenda Item No. 38, at 13
(A/C.5/L.263) (1953).
91. Judgments of the Administrative Tribunal of the International Labour
Organisation Upon Complaints Made Against the United Nations Educational,
Scientific and Cultural Organization, [1956] TC.J. Rep. 77.
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the Administrative Tribunal competent, under Article II of its Statute,
to hear the complaints introduced against the United Nations Educa-
tional, Scientific and Cultural Organization. . : . In any case, what
is the validity of the decisions given by the Administrative Tribunal
. . . ?,,92
5) Constitution of the Maritime Safety Committee of the Inter-
Governmental Maritime Consultative Organization.". "Is the Maritime
Safety Committee of the Inter-Governmental Maritime Consultative
Organization, which was elected on 15 January 1959, constituted in
accordance with the Convention for the Establishment of the Organiza-
tion ?""9
It immediately becomes apparent that, no, matter what answer
the court renders, the opposition of one State will not prevent the
organ requesting the advisory opinion to effectively utilize and imple-
ment the opinion. It is submitted that the advisory process is best
suited, and therefore should only be used, for these types of questions.
In the Reparation for Injuries advisory opinion,. the position of one
State could not prevent the majority of the General Assembly from
authorizing the Secretary-General to act "as efficaciously as possible
with a view to obtaining any reparation due... .. ,' In the Reservation
to Genocide Convention advisory opinion, the majority of the signa-
tory States could decide whether or not a reserving State could be
regarded as a party to the Convention. In the Awards of Administra-
tive Tribunal advisory opinion, the majority of the General Assembly
could give effect to an award of compensation made by the Administra-
tive Tribunal. In the Administrative Tribunal of I.L.O. advisory
opinion, the majority of the Executive Board of the United Nations
Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization could give validity
to the decisions given by the Administrative Tribunal. The Admin-
istrative Tribunal of I.L.O. advisory opinion must be distinguished
from all other advisory opinions rendered by the court because Article
XII of the Statute of the Administrative Tribunal of the International
Labour Organization provides that when an Executive Board of an
international organization tests the validity of the Tribunal's decision by
requesting an advisory opinion from the court, then "the opinion given
by the court shall be binding." 6 Finally, in the Maritime Safety Com-
mittee advisory opinion, the majority of the Assembly of the Inter-
92. Id. at 79.
93. Constitution of the Maritime Safety Committee of the Inter-Governmental
Maritime Consultative Organization, [1960] I.C.J. Rep. 150.
94. Id. at 151.
95. Reparation for Injuries Suffered, supra note 85, at 175.
96. Administrative Tribunal of I.L.O., supra note 91, at 78.
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Governmental Maritime Consultative Organization could dissolve the
existing Maritime Safety Committee and elect a new Committee in
accordance with the Convention as interpreted by the advisory opinion. 97
Whether or not the bodies requesting the advisory opinions will
adhere to the opinions is altogether another matter. The crucial point
is that if a majority does desire to implement the advisory opinion, then
a majority of the requesting body can do so.
VII.
CONCLUSION
Since the active participation of one State was the sine qua non
for the implementation of the first Admission, Interpretation and South-
West Africa advisory opinions, it is submitted that the issues presented
to the court in these requests were more appropriate to contentious
litigation than the advisory process. The court was indeed faced with
such an allegation in the first Interpretation advisory opinion ;98 how-
ever, the court refuted this allegation on jurisdictional grounds, namely,
that advisory opinions have "no binding force."9" If the advisory
opinion's capacity to aid in the solution to the particular problem con-
fronting the United Nations had been used as the criterion, then
it is submitted that the General Assembly should not have requested the
first Admission, Interpretation and South-West Africa opinions, and
that the court was in error in assuming jurisdiction.
Possessing an "authoritative statement of law"' '0 did not help
the United Nations solve the admissions, interpretation and South-
West Africa problems. Authoritative statements of law obtained from
these advisory opinions merely provided certain members of the United
Nations with an additional argumentative item that could be used
against the Soviet Union, Bulgaria, Hungary, Romania and the Union
of South Africa.
This article is neither espousing the proposition that the develop-
ment and utility of international law depends upon the existence of an
effective international police system, nor the proposition that the Inter-
national Court of Justice should only adjudicate minor issues. What
is submitted is the thought that the only issues appropriate for the
impartial third-party advisory process are those issues that, upon
97. The Assembly elected a new Maritime Safety Committee on April 13, 1961.
98. See note 49 supra.
99. See note 50 supra.
100. Sloan, Advisory Jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice, 38 CALIn.
L. Rnv. 830, at 855 (1950).
[VOL. 11 : p. 525
20
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 11, Iss. 3 [1966], Art. 3
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol11/iss3/3
PROBLEM SOLVING PROCESS
adjudication, are directed to the requesting body. By definition, an
adversary proceeding must at least have two parties. On the other
hand, the International Court's advisory procedure, in order to be
functional as a problem solving technique, can only advise the request-
ing body about its own conduct.
Advisory opinions not dependent for implementation upon the
requesting body are not appropriate to the advisory method of settle-
ment. The success of the Expenses advisory opinion ultimately de-
pended upon whether certain States would pay their assessed contribu-
tions to the United Nations. On the other hand, the success of the
Awards of Administrative Tribunal advisory opinion only depended
upon payment being made by the United Nations.1 0' The rights of
the inhabitants of the Territory of South-West Africa to have their
petitions transmitted to the United Nations solely dependent upon
the acts of the Union of South Africa. In contrast, in the Administra-
tive Tribunal of I.L.O. case, "the right of the officials to the benefit of
the judgments of the Tribunal" only depended upon the acts of the
United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization.0 2
The "international person" has been challenged to perform huge
creative tasks. Disputes unresolved by negotiation and compromise
must yield to impartial third-party law. However, as this article has
attempted to indicate, not all disputes are appropriate to the advisory
procedure of the International Court of Justice. Additional forms of
impartial third-party intervention are needed desperately.
101. Effect of Award of Compensation, supra note 89.
102. Judgments of the Administrative Tribunal, supra note 91, at 86.
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